I explain
complicated
things.

17% to 45% in ten weeks.

I.

Product Adoption and PLG.

A pharma client had bought Tact.ai for eight thousand reps. Seventeen per cent of them were using it.

The contract was signed. The product was not.

Problem

Onboarding had been built for the demo, not for a rep’s first Monday.

The nudges were generic. And nobody really owned the question of whether anyone was opening the thing, because the deal was already done.

What I discovered

I followed the journey from first login to regular use and marked where reps stalled.

The people who adopted had something in common. Someone on their own team had shown them how to use it.

Not us. Them.

How I thought

Adoption is a funnel with a product problem inside it.

The first session has to be useful before it is effortful. The nudge has to arrive when the rep needs it, not when marketing remembers. And the people who make it stick have to be theirs.

What I changed

Rebuilt onboarding around the first useful moment. Reworked the in-app nudges around real workflow triggers. Fixed the UX problems that were costing us the second session.

Then built an internal champion network and gave them something worth carrying.

Ten weeks, start to finish.

Business outcome

Adoption went from 17% to 45% across eight thousand reps.

The referrals and case studies that came out of it became the expansion story inside the account. They also became proof we could take to the next pharma buyer.

III.

Account-Based Marketing. Aktana.

Two product launches run as one ABM motion. A field tool for last-mile engagement, and a strategy and orchestration tool for the people running the campaign from the top. Twenty accounts, twelve at the centre. The field tool was the way in. The strategy tool was the deal.

Problem

We were spreading marketing across a market where a handful of accounts held most of the meaningful revenue. And we had two products aimed at two very different buyers, which is usually how you end up marketing both badly. The sales library had grown by accumulation: assets nobody used, decks that had outlived their argument, battlecards that had been written once and never opened again.

What I discovered

Two levels of research, and both were necessary. Account level: what each account was trying to do, who inside it cared, and what they needed to hear. Industry level: the competitive and partner landscape, product line by product line, across Salesforce, IQVIA, Veeva and the rest. That second layer told me where we genuinely competed and where we could sit alongside an incumbent instead of fighting it. That distinction became the message.

The sequencing came out of the same research. The field tool solved a problem someone could feel this quarter, so it opened the door. The strategy tool was what a senior business buyer needed to see their campaign performance end to end, and that was the enterprise conversation. Leading with the strategy tool would have meant asking for the enterprise decision before we had earned it.

How I thought

Lead with the narrative the account already has, then map the product to it. Land with the field tool, expand into the strategy tool. If an asset did not serve one of the twenty accounts, it had no reason to exist, so it went.

What I changed

Built account-specific narratives and mapped each to the product we wanted to lead with. Deleted the sales library and rebuilt it in Showpad from scratch. New battlecards. Full competitive enablement, including where to partner rather than displace. The same programme drove the pharma event strategy, so the field and the stage were running one argument instead of two.

Business outcome

Nine pilots on the field tool and one enterprise deal on the strategy suite, inside a single sales cycle, in a market where that cycle usually runs six to twelve months.

• ↗ Product launches — aktana.com/resources

V.

Aktana Website.

Everyone in pharma had decided they were agentic. Every competitor site said the same thing. None of them explained how, and none of them said what it would actually do for the buyer.

Problem

The site talked about the technology in depth. Product owned the messaging, not marketing. So the site explained model architecture to commercial leads who did not care about model architecture. Features, not outcomes.

What I discovered

Nobody in the interviews could tell me what the product did. Not one person. They could describe the meeting where they wished it existed. I went through the competitor sites and found the same gap. They said agentic. They did not say how, and they did not say what changed as a result. That was the part my buyers wanted.

How I thought

Build the site around the meeting, not the machine. Every page had to answer a question a buyer had already asked out loud, in the words they used. If I could not attribute a sentence to someone, it came out.

What I changed

New site, new narrative, all copy rewritten around three commercial roles. Cut sixty per cent of the pages. Kept one page on product architecture and gave it to product to write. The rest of the site ran on the commercial story, the same one we were already using in the ABM campaigns.

Business outcome

Qualified pipeline from the website up 3.4×. Sales stopped opening calls by explaining what the product did.

• ↗ aktana.com